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The Philosophical Problem of Eternal Life: Reading  





Abstract: In this article I analyse the philosophical 
problem of eternal life through Wittgenstein’s and 
Heidegger’s analysis of dying as a philosophical concept. 
Using the latter part of the Tractatus, in fact, it is possible 
to read differently Heidegger’s lessons on the 
fundamental concepts of metaphysics, so as to claim that 
there are some really immortal life forms: those without 
memory. 
 





Nothing is eternal: psychological time runs parallel to the 
thermodynamic arrow. Death simply arrives. The only 
possible form of eternity happens when psychological 
time does not flow because it does not know its parallel: it 
does not know it will die. “He lives eternally who lives in 
the present”, says Wittgenstein (Tractatus, 6.4311): if one 
is not in the past (through memory) or in the future 
(through projects) but only exists in the “here and now”, 
one is literally eternal – the arrow crashes. In his 
Fundamental Concepts Of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, 
Solitude, his 1929-30 lectures, Martin Heidegger claims 
more than once that “the animal cannot die”: it just “stops 
living”. This controversial position was then interpreted, 
but also theorized by Heidegger himself, as a negative 
conception of the animal: it is “poor in world”. Mortality 
is denied to it.  
 
 
2. In this paper I will try to overturn Heidegger through 
Wittgenstein1. First of all if Wittgenstein is right, and 
eternity is therefore an eternal present, then the same 
reasons why Heidegger deprives animals of mortality are 
those that make it eternal: animality – with no long-term 
memory, with no distinction between the present / past / 
future – is eternal. Eternity only exists in animality. 
 
 
3. The preliminary question is: what does it mean to die? 
Evidently, both in Wittgenstein and in Heidegger 
(although the former, too, compares it to the “world that 
ends”), it is not simply the end of life: that is death, not 
dying. The point here is not to revive the Epicurean issue 
of the fear of dying2, but rather to understand what dying 
is in philosophical terms.3 Both perspectives imply the 
perception of death: Heidegger’s in the ability to separate 
oneself from the outside world so as to prove its 
“possession”, while Wittgenstein’s in altering one’s 
practice to the extent that perception is temporally limited 
to the present time. If this is dying then the non-dying of 
which Heidegger speaks negatively so as to create a 
hierarchy (weak, but still clear)4 between living entities, is 
instead the immortality yearned for by our species. 
 
 
4. Immortality belongs to very young children and 
animals that are not too complex from a neuro-cognitive 
standpoint: eternity belongs to the simple; death to the 
complex. The relationship between simple and complex is 
not quantitative but worldly: it is a matter of being inside 
or outside the world. 
 
 
5. This reading of Heidegger through Wittgenstein leads 
to the thesis that “The solution of the problem of life is 
seen in the vanishing of this problem”5: the present is a 
full space. But how can we reach it if the adult condition 
of Homo Sapiens seems intrinsically tied to the dimension 
of dying? The life/death distinction is an all-encom-
passing cognitive map: it limits all of our actions. “Our 
life is endless in the way that our visual field is without 
limit”: thus Wittgenstein famously stated in his Tractatus 
(6.4311). But what does this mean? Or, to stick within 
Wittgenstein’s encyclopaedia, what “means”? The dis-
tinction between life and death is polysemic: it is political 
because, as is known, it has been administered thanks to 
biopolitical thought; it is metaphysical by definition. In 
one of the most complex and less known parts of the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein suggests that this distinction be-
tween life and death is not appropriate, despite stating in 
6.4312 that “The temporal immortality of the human soul, 
that is to say, its eternal survival after death, is not only in 
no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place 
will not do for us what we always tried to make it do.” 
Sharp distinctions often propose a view that only holds 
within a system: in fact, while it is obvious that the dead 
differ from the living, because the former are not and the 
latter are, it is far from obvious that the living can die. 
This issue is not trivial, and the whole administration of 
existence is stratified based on this possibility. And yet, if 
by possibility we mean the things that the subject can do, 
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dying simply isn’t one. We may think that it is possible to 
approach death, but death always comes as an external 
event: the world ceases to be without us being aware of it. 
If Wittgenstein’s reading key is true – that is, if only he 
who lives in the present lives eternally – one can see why 
politics in every form is based on time management: poli-
tics has to make us mortal.  
 
 
6. The riddle of life cannot be solved with the great 
dictionaries of natural science: this is a philosophical 
problem that has no coextension with any other discipline. 
What follows both from the analysis of Wittgenstein and 
from my interpretation through the lenses of Heidegger, is 
that the human being has the potential for immortality: if 
you are not able to separate life and death, and if death is 
not lived, then you’re literally immortal. From this point it 
follows that the living / mortal distinction is a hole in the 
extended present in which every form of life should exist: 
a time that is levelled day and night, but not through the 
anxiety of the linear flow of the things of the world. This 
hole, which partly turns every memory into a form of 
nostalgia and transforms the future into a goal to reach by 
stages, is the essential passage of the organization of the 
living: the flow of events has to be administered. As 
mentioned, immortality aims to focus on children and 
animals, and is already present within them: what should 
the constructive proposal be at this point? The solution to 
the problem of living lies in the destruction of “human 
life” as it has been understood by human sciences: the 
space that must follow is a timeless space. Here one must 
be careful because the implied philosophy becomes 
deliberately dangerous, taking a stance against 
contemporary human beings and in favour of a species to 
come, able to go back to the eternity of time promised by 
Wittgenstein and condemned by Heidegger. The idea that 
consciousness is a gift to be paid on a daily basis at the 
price of suffering which characterizes us as a species is a 
false myth created by the philosophy of mind: memory, 
writing, temporalised memories are exactly what 
philosophy, with an extreme paradoxical effort of 
memory, must aim to eliminate. The animal life form is 
the ultimate goal. 
 
 
7. The “child” is a concept: the people of eternity is 
composed of such concepts. “The things that we have 
owned for decades may be the mirror of our experience of 
time going by” 6. This buildup, which is not only memory 
but also physical possession, is what fundamentally 
triggers the life / death distinction: the destruction of the 
archive, represented by the child deprived of ownership 
(even of the concept of property), is its starting point. The 
issue is related to images: what you already own as a pre-
visual legacy. In fact, as John Berger argued, all images 
are a human product, and our world has been built on 
collecting (which is the real sense of contemporary 
ontologies, because thus we operate “an attempt to 
challenge the threat of death. Collecting a number of 
objects means imposing, at least for a moment, a sense of 
order on a universe that has none”7. Therefore, it is 
against this apparent metaphysical order, which soon 
turns into domination, that the philosophical problem of 
eternal life must work. The child thus becomes an ally –  
without objects, images, memory –  and represents the 
starting state of mind whence to reach immortality. 
 
 
8. Children are on the other side of any Kantian 
schematism: the horror experienced when facing the 
platypus, which is unclassifiable so that one has to create 
new ad hoc categories for it, is only an issue for those 
who need to reduce all of reality to their theories. A 
problem for adults. After all, The Little Prince by Antoine 
de Saint-Exupery is a book of naive metaphysics: 
immortality looks a little like the strange space travel 
described in it (where space, by definition, is always 
space-time). Jacques Derrida, in his The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, had sought this new ontological starting 
point in animality – to be precise, in a cat surprised by his 
nakedness8. In my view, he was mistaken: Martin 
Heidegger was right, then, because animals have no need 
to relate to the world. Animals are the world.  
Humans fracture the “we-world” relationship and it is 
starting from this fracture, which is already a residue in 
Clément’s sense, that we must look for the origin of man. 
Traditional ontology, which runs like a thread from 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to Quine’s work, would 
largely approve of the image of a world that is always 
seen through a filter - this filter being schematism 
(linguistic, cognitive, or in some other form, it is always a 
paraphrase of “being that can be understood is 
language”). In its most recent version in cognitive 
science, then, the underlying idea is that - to put it with 
Kant - “intuitions without concept are blind” (think of the 
discourses on equivalent interpretations in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics). The point is that this vision has 
literally imposed itself on reality, because every form of 
cleverly oriented description becomes a prescription, and 
thus we are no longer able to know what is not given for 
us to know to begin with. Therefore, knowledge always 
amounts to complying with a schema: that which does not 
find its place either has the privilege of a new box (the 
platypus), or - simply - does not exist, as it has been 
deprived of all its properties that fall under other boxes, 
up until eliminating the surprising whole we initially had. 
 
A “surprising whole” is that special kind of entity that, in violation of 
any schema category, forces us to see a new portion of the world: since 
the schema does not contemplate surprise, the classical reaction is its 
compression into a previous category. 
 
The child is free from schematism, as genetics does not 
weigh more than the environment. This produces a similar 
situation to that of a world that emerges, within a childish 
and animal space, crossing the minds of those who inhabit 
it - who then, having acknowledged of the world, will use 
it to experience it. In fact, in this case, what we see is al-
ways a world that comes from behind: an ontology emer-
ging on the basis of the manifestation of reality not only 
as a “negative resistance” but also, and primarily, as posi-
tive emergence9. The child sees the world in the sense of-
ten discussed by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “the child learns 
by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief” 10. 
Whom would we believe, if there were no adults? Here is 
the destruction of memory that I mentioned above: the 
human would, finally, start rebuilding and the essential 
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items, previously invisible to the eyes, would once again 
be visible. The apocalypse, perhaps, is immortality: if you 
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